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Varity Corp. v. Howe in the Wake of
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates: Did the
Supreme Court Impermissibly
Authorize a Damages Award Under
ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(B)?
I.

Introduction

In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") 1 which was designed, in part, to protect
two forms of employee benefits: pension plans and non-pension
benefits ("welfare benefits")., ERISA represents a congressional
reaction to the profound effect of wide-spread corporate default in
the payment of pensions and benefits to plan participants.3
Specifically, Congress was "[c]oncerned that many pension plans
were being corruptly or ineptly mismanaged and that American
workers were losing their financial security in retirement as a
result. '
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, three federal statutes
regulated the pension system: the Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Act,5 the Labor Management Relations Act,6 and the
Internal Revenue Code.7 Congress intended the Welfare and

1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
3. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (describing
purpose of ERISA as promoting "the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans and to protect contractually defined benefits") (internal quotationmarks and citations omitted).
4. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1968), repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (1994).
7. I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503 (1954). See also Christopher F. Robertson, Closing the
Massachusetts Mutual v. Russell Gap: Monetary Damage Awards Under ERISA Section
502(a) (3), 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 691, 693 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641 (listing three statutes that covered pension plan security
prior to 1974).
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Pension Plan Disclosure Act to enable plan participants and
beneficiaries to manage pension plans themselves8 by "requiring
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto."9 Congress
created section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act to
provide for the development and operation of employee pension
plans.1 t This Act, however, did not provide standards of conduct

governing proper plan management." Finally, Congress intended
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code to indicate the types of

plans that would qualify as pensions for income accounting
procedures. 12 These statutes, considered together, contained only

minimal provisions for the protection of pension and benefit
security. Further, none of these statutes included comprehensive13

provisions that served to govern pension security in its entirety.

Congress, therefore, enacted ERISA to fill that void.14
ERISA does not require employers to offer employee benefit
programs to their employees. 5 However, when employers choose
to offer these programs, two types governed by ERISA include
pension plans and welfare plans. 6 While pension plans provide
retirement income or deferred income, 7 welfare plans provide
death, disability, education, medical, severance, or vacation
benefits. 8 These plans require the participation of four parties:9

8. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 693.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 301.
10. See id. § 302.
11. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 693. The general purposes of the Labor
Management Relations Act included the clarification of rights of both employer and
employee and procedures for dispute settlements. See 29 U.S.C. § 141.
12. See I.R.C. § 401.
13. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 694; see also S. REP. No. 93-127, at 3 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4841 (indicating lack of comprehensive statute
governing pension security).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
15. See M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

1-15 (1988) (stating that the creation of benefit plans is not required by law).
16. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: ExtracontractualDamagesMandatedfor Benefit
Claims Actions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 611, 614 (1994) (asserting that "ERISA provides
participants recovery for extracontractual damages in certain situations, just as if the benefitsdue lawsuit were brought under either contract law or trust law").
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). This list of benefits is not exhaustive. Pension plans
are further subdivided into two forms: (1) the defined contribution plan for which the plan
document specifies the annual contribution; and (2) the defined plan, for which the plan
document specifies the amount of the retirement benefit. See id. § 1002(34), (35).
18. See id. § 1002(1)(A).
19. See Flint, supra note 16, at 614-15.
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(1) "an employer, who makes contributions to the plan and
appoints both the plan administrator and trustee; '2° (2) an
administrator, who administers the plan; 21 (3) a trustee, who
invests the plan's funds; 22 and (4) a participant, who receives the
benefits. 23 The first three parties are considered plan fiduci24
aries.
The Act assigns to an ERISA "fiduciary "25 a number of
detailed obligations which include "the proper management,

administration, and investment of [plan] assets, the maintenance of
proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest. 2 6 ERISA section 409(a),27
imposes liability on a fiduciary for any breach of duty, and it
describes the remedies authorized by the statute against the

breaching fiduciary.28 Generally, the law protects plans subject to
ERISA by providing insurance, 29 specifying pension plan characteristics,3" and indicating the fiduciary duties applicable to the
management of pension and welfare benefit plans.31 While the
statute requires employers to "prefund" pension plans by reserving
cash in trust funds,3 2 it does not require employers to prefund

20. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5), (16)(A).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).
22. See id. § 1103(a).
23. See id. § 1002(6)-(8).
24. See Flint, supra note 16, at 615; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1103(a).
25. An ERISA "fiduciary" includes the persons named as fiduciaries by a benefit plan
and anyone else who exercises discretionary control or authority over the plan's management, administration, or assets. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
26. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1985).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
28. ERISA provides that:
[Tihe fiduciary is personally liable for damages ("to make good to [the] plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach"), for restitution ("to restore to
[the] plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary"), and for "such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate," including the removal of the fiduciary.
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,252 (1993) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (ERISA
section 502(a)(2)).
29. ERISA provides insurance for vested pension rights. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1301
(ERISA section 4001).
30. ERISA indicates when and how pensions vest. See id. §§ 1051-1061 (ERISA
sections 201-211).
31. See id. § 1104.
32. Subchapter I, subtitle B, part 3 of ERISA prescribes funding requirements. See id.
§§ 1081-1086.
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welfare benefits.3 3 Nonetheless, ERISA imposes several obligations on employers for welfare benefits.
Specifically, these
obligations include disclosure requirements,34 a fiduciary duty,35
and obligations not to act arbitrarily 36 and to provide a "summary
plan description," which is a plain statement of the benefits
provided.37
ERISA section 502(a) authorizes plan participants to bring
civil actions in six situations: (1) for the civil penalty for failure to
provide required information once requested; (2) for benefits due,
to enforce rights, or to declare rights under the terms of the plan;
(3) for appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty; (4) to enjoin
violations of the plan or ERISA; (5) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief; and (6) to obtain relief for failure to provide
annual benefit statements. 38 These remedies suggest that Congress contemplated that ERISA-governed programs would lend
themselves to future violations of the Act.
Although ERISA was designed to facilitate the administration
and disbursement of employee pension plans, employment benefits,
and welfare benefits, the Act contains complex provisions that have
been the source of heated controversy since its inception.39
ERISA section 502(a)(3) is one of several provisions that has been
the focus of recent dispute.' ERISA section 502(a)(3) provides
that:
A civil action may be brought ...

(3) by a participant, benefi-

ciary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the

33. See generally id. § 1081.
34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
35. See id. §§ 1101-1114.
36. ERISA itself does not provide a standard of review for actions under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 challenging eligibility determinations. The federal courts have supplied the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108
(1989).
37. The law requires the summary plan description to be "written in a manner calculated
to be understood by the average plan participant, and ... sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably appraise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights."
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1).
38. See id. § 1132(a).
39. See Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current
Case and Other Developments, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: PENSION, PROFITSHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION PLANS I (The American Law Institute
1996).
40. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 16; Robertson, supra note 7.
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plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan.41

Specifically, the federal circuit courts have reached conflicting
results in determining whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes
employee benefit and pension plan participants and beneficiaries to
obtain individual equitable relief1 2 in a cause of action to redress
violations of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of the Act.43
Furthermore, the federal courts have achieved conflicting results
with respect to whether "other appropriate equitable relief"
authorized under section 502(a)(3)(B) may take the form of
compensatory damages. Several federal courts have held that
section 502(a)(3)(B) does not authorize awards of monetary
damages.' Other courts have allowed individual plan participants
to recover monetary damage awards under that section. Accordingly, the question remains as to what exactly "other appropriate
equitable relief" might be for claims that are brought pursuant to
section 502(a)(3)(B). 6

41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
42. As opposed to recovery on behalf of the plan as a whole, this relief is merely for the
individual participant.
43. Several courts of appeals have held that section 502 (a) (3) does not authorize
awards of relief to individuals when the section is applied to a claim for breach of fiduciary
obligation. See, e.g. McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint Inc., 46 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, vacated by 116 S. Ct. 1346, remanded to 102 F.3d 376 (9th Cir. 1996), and cert
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1823 (1997); Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614 (11th
Cir. 1991). These courts have held instead that section 502(a)(3) authorizes only suits to
obtain relief for the ERISA plan as a whole. See, e.g., Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993); Anweiler v. American Elec. Power
Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993).
44. See, e.g., Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 1994) (Where plan
participant argued that he was entitled to equitable relief in the form of damages under
ERISA section 502(a)(3), the court held that plaintiff's claim, while equitable in nature, was
for monetary damages which does not qualify for "other appropriate equitable relief"
pursuant to that section.); Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that section 502(a)(3) does not authorize the recovery of extra-contractual damages
for breach of fiduciary duty because the relief is not equitable in nature); Green v. Aim
Executive, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that damages sought under
ERISA section 502(a)(3) could not be characterized as restitutionary damages but instead
were traditional compensatory damages not recoverable under that section).
45. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding an award of
back pay and front pay as compensation for retaliatory discharge in violation of ERISA
section 510 and characterizing compensation as "restitution" which was "appropriate
equitable relief" pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 819 (1995).
46. Significantly, the issue as to what constitutes "appropriate equitable relief" remains,
notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court has attempted to settle this conflict. See
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The purpose of this comment is to suggest that the question
whether an individual plaintiff can recover damages under ERISA
section 502(a)(3)(B) is not settled in suits against employers for
breach of their fiduciary duty. This comment will also demonstrate
that while direct damages should be available as a form of relief
under section 502(a)(3)(B), the courts should preclude plaintiffs
from obtaining relief that includes consequential damages.47
Although the Supreme Court intended to resolve this issue in
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,4 8 where the Court held that damages

are not recoverable under section 502(a)(3), the Court limited the
scope of that decision to persons who are not fiduciaries but act in
concert with those who are fiduciaries."9

The Court failed to

indicate whether an employer acting in a fiduciary capacity can be
held liable for damages under that section.' Furthermore, even
if one interprets Mertens to mean that damages are not authorized

by section 502(a)(3)(B) under any circumstances, the Court's recent
decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe5 nevertheless calls into question
whether Mertens is binding. In Varity, the Court affirmed an

Eighth Circuit decision that permitted plaintiffs to recover a
monetary award under section 502(a)(3)(B) by characterizing the
relief as restitution. 52 There, the award included both contractual
and consequential damages.5 3
This comment suggests that, in light of Varity, individual
plaintiffs may very well be able to recover damages in suits brought
pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B). This conclusion conflicts
with the guidelines established in Mertens. Accordingly, Varity can

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding that the "appropriate equitable
relief' available under section 502(a)(3) is traditional "equitable" relief (restitution,
injunctive relief, etc.) not "legal damages"). See also discussion infra Part III.
47. The distinction between direct damages and consequential damages is critical.
Direct damages are contractual and flow directly from the terms of any plan. Consequential
damages are extracontractual and, therefore, not included within the plan's terms. Most
scholarly articles relating to this issue ignore this distinction and focus only on whether
consequential damages are permitted under ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B). See Flint, supra
note 16, at 611; Robertson, supra note 7, at 691. See also discussion infra Part V.B.
48. 508 U.S. at 248.
49. See id. at 251.
50. See id. at 254-55 (stating that "we decide this case on the narrow battlefield the
parties have chosen, and reserve decision of that antecedent question").
51. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
52. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994).
53. See id. at 757 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
value of benefits included in the amount the court awarded as restitution was "traditional
consequential legal damages, and unrecoverable under" ERISA section 502(a)(3)).
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be understood only through a clarification of the available remedies
under section 502(a)(3)(B) either by Congress or subsequent
Supreme Court interpretation.
Part II of the comment explains how the federal courts
approached the damages issue prior to Mertens. Part III presents
an analysis of Mertens and its limiting impact on the availability of
damages as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
section 502(a)(3). Part IV furnishes an analysis of Varity and
explains how the outcome of that case is inconsistent with the
holding in Mertens. Finally, Part V observes the problems posed
by the result in Varity.
II.

Consequential Damages: The Federal Courts Prior to
Mertens

In ERISA: ExtracontractualDamages Mandated for Benefit
Claims Actions,54 Professor George Lee Flint, Jr.55 observes that
prior to Mertens, federal courts resolved "the question of whether
a participant may recover consequential damages under the rubric
of 'other appropriate equitable relief"' through two lines of
reasoning. 6
While one strategy construed that language to
authorize damages as an equitable remedy under trust law, the
other method considered that language to preclude damage
awards.57
The federal courts that supported awards of damages 8 relied

on Justice Brennan's reasoning in his concurring opinion in

54. Flint, supra note 16, at 611, 614 (asserting that "ERISA provides participants
recovery for extracontractual damages in certain situations, just as if the benefits-due lawsuit
were brought under either contract law or trust law").
55. See id. at 611 n.* (Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas).
56. Id. at 627.
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1298-99 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopting Brennan's theory for a beneficiary suing for COBRA
benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3)); Richards v. G.M. Corp., 991
F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (5th
Cir. 1992) (observing that both trust law and contract law permit extracontractual damages
but that no trust law cases authorized recovery for emotional injuries), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1033 (1992); Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 982 (6th Cir. 1990); Powell v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting the trust law
equitable damage remedy as requiring malice and fraud, which was absent, so plaintiff did
not recover), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
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Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell.59 There,
Justice Brennan stated that Congress intended to include trust law
fiduciary standards in section 404(a) of ERISA and, therefore,

courts may appropriately apply "black-letter trust law that
fiduciaries owe strict duties running directly to beneficiaries in the
administration and payment of trust benefits." 6 Further, Justice

Brennan opined that trust law provides that a "beneficiary is
entitled to a remedy 'which will put him in the position in which he
would have been if the trustee had not committed the breach of
trust.' ' '61 Accordingly, Justice Brennan determined that "other
appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3)(B) includes
the provision of monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duties
set forth in section 404(a).62
In contrast, the several courts holding that section 502(a)(3)(B)

does not support an award of the trust law equitable remedy for
extracontractual damages 63 have relied on two arguments.'
Here, Professor Flint recognizes that the reasons "used by the
Supreme Court in Russell to foreclose consequential damages under
section 502(a)(2) also apply to section 502(a)(3)(B). 65 First,
section 409(a) of ERISA, applicable to the breach of fiduciary

action under section 502(a)(2), contains the phrase "equitable or

59. 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (holding that a plan beneficiary may seek relief under ERISA
section 502(a)(2) on behalf of the plan as a whole but not for the benefit of a particular
individual).
60. Id. at 152-53.
61. Id. at 157 n.16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959)).
62. See id. at 154 n.10.
63. See, e.g., Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that
medical reimbursements resulting from unfunded plan constituted nonrecoverable
extracontractual damages); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1992)
(addressing a participant who sued for amount of income taxes that could have been avoided
had the plan administrator informed participant that his distribution could be rolled-over tax
free into an IRA), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 65661 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that participants leaving a law firm received delayed retirement
plan payments, suffering credit interest expenses and additional taxes from new tax laws),
cert. denied sub nom. Bihler v. Eisenberg, 506 U.S. 818 (1992); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare
Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 931 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1991);
Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n-Associated Maritime Officers, Med.
Plan, 857 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to permit amendment of the petition to
include damages under section 502(a)(3)(B)); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846
F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that extracontractual damages were unavailable as a
remedy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
64. See Flint, supra note 16, at 629-31.
65. Id. at 631.
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remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate., 66 • The
Supreme Court has ruled that this language excludes extracontractual damages from the pool of remedies available to a participant.67
The Court has found that the similar language within section
502(a)(3)(B), "other appropriate equitable relief," so closely
resembles that found in section 409(a) that it too should preclude
recovery of extracontractual damages. 6 Fuer, these courts relied
on the fact that the terms of section 502(a)(3)(B) do not expressly
include extracontractual damages. 69
Because "the statutory
remedy scheme is so well interlocked, interrelated, and interdependent," these courts followed the Supreme Court's lead in concluding that they "cannot read into the statute an additional remedy,
such as extracontractual damages."7
Second, these courts relied on ERISA's legislative history, and
they determined that "other appropriate equitable relief" authorized only injunctions and declaratory relief. 71 These courts
reasoned that the Senate Finance Committee report referred only
to injunctions, constructive trusts, and removal when discussing the
language of section 502(a)(3)(B). 72 Accordingly, these courts
concluded that the section did not authorize awards of extracontractual damages. 73 This reasoning falls directly in line with the
course of argument later established in Mertens.
74

III. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
A. Background of the Conflict

In Mertens, the Supreme Court considered the types of relief
authorized to plaintiffs under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 75 and it
held that the section authorizes only traditional equitable relief,
such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages.7 6 In Mertens, a class of former employees of the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141-43 (1985).
See Flint, supra note 16, at 628.
See id. at 632; see, e.g., Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1986).
Flint, supra note 16, at 632.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 633.
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
See id. at 252-53.
See id. at 248.
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Kaiser Steel Corporation ("Kaiser"), who participated in the Kaiser
Retirement Plan," brought suit against the plan's nonfiduciary
actuary ("Mertens") who assisted the fiduciaries in reducing the
employer's contributions to the plan.78 Mertens' actions caused
the plan to be funded inadequately and eventually terminated.7 9
The plaintiffs alleged that Mertens had caused the termination by
authorizing Kaiser to select the plan's actuarial assumptions, by

failing to disclose that Kaiser was one of its clients, and by failing
to disclose the plan's funding shortfall.8" Ultimately, the plaintiffs

claimed that the termination precluded them from receiving the
fully vested pensions they were entitled to under the plan.8

The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed the complaint, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part.82 The
plan participants subsequently sought certiorari only on the
question whether ERISA authorizes suits for money damages

against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's
breach of fiduciary duty.83

In holding that ERISA does not authorize suits for money
damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court recognized

that the relief the petitioners were in fact seeking was "nothing
77. See id. at 250. Kaiser Retirement Plan was a qualified pension plan subject to the
ERISA provisions. See id.
78. See id.
79. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) Mertens was the plan's actuary in 1980,
when Kaiser began to phase out its steel making operations, promoting early retirement by
a large number of plan participants; (2) Mertens failed to change the plan's actuarial
assumptions to reflect the additional costs imposed by the retirements; (3) as a result, Kaiser
did not adequately fund the plan; (4) the plan's assets became insufficient to satisfy the
benefit obligations; (5) the foregoing events caused the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC") to terminate the plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341; and (6)
accordingly, the plan participants were entitled only to the benefits guaranteed by ERISA,
which were substantially lower than the fully vested pensions due to them under the plan.
See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
80. See id.
81. See id. In opposing Mertens' motion to dismiss the claim, the plaintiff's asserted
that:
[Mertens] was liable (1) as an ERISA fiduciary that committed a breach of its own
fiduciary duties, (2) as a nonfiduciary that knowingly participated in the plan
fiduciaries' breach of their fiduciary duties, and (3) as a non fiduciary that
committed a breach of nonfiduciary duties imposed on actuaries by ERISA.
Id. at 251.
82. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 948 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251.
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other than compensatory damages-monetary relief for all losses
their plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary
duties." 84 Further, the Court stated that although it had not
previously interpreted the phrase "other appropriate equitable
relief," as used in ERISA, it had understood similar language in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 "to preclude 'awards for compensatory or
punitive damages."' 85
The petitioners asserted, however, that since ERISA was
rooted in the common law of trusts, which recognizes damages as
a proper form of equitable relief, the Court should similarly
interpret "other appropriate equitable relief" within the meaning
of ERISA to include compensatory or punitive damages. 8 6 The
Court acknowledged that, given ERISA's roots in the law of trusts,
"equitable relief" could in theory mean all relief available for
breach of trust in the common law courts of equity; this would
include the relief sought by the petitioners.8 7 However, the Court
struck down this argument with the observation that since all relief
available for breach of trust could be obtained from an equity
court, a broad interpretation would render the modifier "equitable," within the statute, superfluous. 88 Furthermore, the Court
determined that such a reading would deprive of all meaning the
distinction Congress drew between "equitable relief" and "remedial" and "legal relief" as indicated throughout the ERISA statute.89 In holding that damages are not authorized as a remedy
under section 502(a)(3), the Supreme Court "stripped ERISA trust
beneficiaries of a remedy against trustees and third parties that
they enjoyed in the equity courts under common law."'

84. Id. at 255.
85. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992).
86. See id. at 255.
87. See id. at 257.
88. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-58.
89. See id. at 258. Writing for the Majority, Justice Scalia dispensed with two other
arguments that supported the availability of damages as a remedy under section 502(a)(3).
He argued that since the Department of Labor Regulations excludes monetary damages,
ERISA's allocation of remedial relief to that Department for "any amount ... ordered by
a court to be paid" under identical language of "appropriate equitable relief' excludes
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 260. In addition, Justice Scalia asserted that a
narrow interpretation of available ERISA remedies is consistent with the statute since broad
policy statements cannot take precedence over specific words in the statute. See id. at 262.
90. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting).
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The Dissent

One should consider that Mertens was neither a unanimous
decision nor supported by an overwhelming majority.91 Rather,
Mertens was the product of a five-to-four vote which suggests that,
even when the case was decided, considerable disagreement existed
over the
proper interpretation of "other appropriate equitable
92
relief.
In his dissent, Justice White indicated that Mertens is inconsistent with the Court's prior holdings because the result requires the
Court to interpret "ERISA in a way that 'would afford less
protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed
before ERISA was enacted."' 93 He reasoned that the common
law of trusts governed most benefit plans prior to Congress'
enactment of ERISA.94 Accordingly, Congress extracted the
ERISA fiduciary duties largely from the common law of trusts.95
Trust law, therefore, provided the starting point for any inquiry
into the proper interpretation of ERISA fiduciary duties.96 Trust
law, likewise, served as a guide for courts in their efforts to define
the proper scope of "appropriate equitable relief" for breaches of
trust pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3).97
Justice White further observed that the principal fora at
common law for beneficiary claims originating from breaches of
trust were the courts of equity.9 8 Compensatory damages were
traditionally available in the courts of equity to a trust beneficiary
as an equitable remedy against trustees for breach of duty and

91. Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and
O'Connor joined, wrote the dissenting opinion. See id. (White, J., dissenting).
92. See generally id. at 248.
93. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)).
94. See id. at 264-65.
95. See id.
96. See id. One should note, however, that the Supreme Court has indicated that:
[T]he law of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the
outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties. In some instances ... courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the
statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust
requirements. And, in doing so, courts may have to take account of competing
congressional purposes.
Id.
97. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11.
98. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 265-66 (White, J., dissenting).
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against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participated in a breach of
trust.99 Justice White concluded that the purpose of equity was to
restore the parties to the position each would have been in had no
breach of trust occurred. 00 Payment of monetary awards often
achieved that end. 0 1 As Varity demonstrates, Justice White's
reasoning is plausible in some situations, at least to the extent that
direct damages may very well serve to restore a plaintiff to the
contractual position that the plaintiff would have occupied had no
breach of the contract occurred.
IV. Varity Corp. v. Howe"~
A. Background of the Conflict
In Varity, the Supreme Court answered, in the affirmative, the
long-standing question whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes
a plan participant to sue in an individual capacity for an employer's
breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court, however, declined
the opportunity to explain the meaning of "other appropriate
equitable relief" beyond the definition it had established in
Mertens. Rather, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that had
allowed the plaintiffs to recover monetary relief in the form of
"restitution.' t°3 In holding that the plaintiffs' "remedy is consistent with the literal language of the statute, the Act's purposes, and
pre-existing trust law,"1 " the Supreme Court failed to consider
that the court of appeals had actually fashioned a remedy in the
form of damages, not restitution,0 5 and that the court of appeals
had merely characterized the plaintiffs' money award as "restitu-

99. See id. at 265.
100. See id. at 266.
101, See id.
102. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
103. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.
105. The difference between "damages" and "restitution" was the sole subject of dissent
in the court of appeals. See Varity, 36 F.3d at 757 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The money damages were awarded for "past benefits lost" by employees
after the employer's plan folded. The Majority called the award "restitution," but Judge
Hansen believed they were traditional consequential legal damages and unrecoverable under
section 502(a)(3). See id. See also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248 (Justice Scalia's discussion of
equitable relief versus money damages).
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tion" in an effort to by-pass the "damages" hurdle."°
The
Supreme Court's failure to address this issue in Varity raises serious
questions regarding what an individual plaintiff might recover in a
suit brought pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B).
B.

The History of Varity

The Varity action began in 1989 when former employees,
disabled employees, retirees and eligible dependents of retirees,
and disabled employees of the Massey Combines Corporation
("MCC") challenged the company's termination of welfare
employee benefits and retiree medical benefits."° These plaintiffs
were originally employees of Massey-Ferguson Inc. ("M-F Inc."),
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant Varity Corporation
("Varity Corp.").1 8 In 1986, however, the plaintiffs were transferred to MCC through Varity Corp.'s corporate restructuring plan,
"Project Sunshine."'" Furthermore, these plaintiffs were originally participants in, and beneficiaries of, M-F Inc.'s self-funded
employee welfare benefit plan, an ERISA-protected plan administered by M-F Inc.11° Through Project Sunshine, however, Varity
Corp. intended to eliminate its obligation to pay the debts of its
transferred divisions, and it sought to expunge its liabilities to pay
medical and other welfare benefits.111

106. Under Mertens, "damages" are not recoverable under section 502(a)(3). See
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257. "Recently courts have struggled to define the boundary between
permissible equitable relief and impermissible consequential damages under ERISA." Siske
et al., supra note 39, at 100.
107. See Howe v. Varity Corp., No. CIV.88-1598-E, 1989 WL 95595, at *1 (S.D. Iowa July
14, 1989).
108. Varity Corp. is a Canadian corporation that manufactures and distributes farm
machinery and other related products. M-F Inc., located in Iowa, is the operating unit for
Varity's farm equipment sales in the United States. MCC was a Canadian corporation
created by Varity through the execution and implementation of a series of agreements
known as the "Project Sunshine" agreements. See id. at *2.
109. See id. at *1. In the mid-1980s, Varity Corp. became concerned that several of its
subsidiary businesses were losing too much money. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 492. Accordingly,
Varity Corp.'s corporate restructuring resulted in a large-scale transfer of operations and
obligations. Specifically, "[t]he transferred operations included ... combine production,
distribution and marketing, foundries, four-wheel drive tractors, rectangular balers, seeding
and tillage equipment, and retail stores." Varity, 1989 WL 95595, at *2. In addition, Varity
Corp. transferred nearly 1,500 employees and approximately 3,750 retirees from several of
its branches to MCC. See id.
110. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 492.
111. See id. at 493.
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Project Sunshine enabled Varity Corp. to eliminate its
liabilities by collecting its money-losing divisions into MCC
becoming a separately incorporated, but ultimately undercapitalized, subsidiary.112 Then, by inducing its employees to transfer
their employment and benefits expectations to MCC, the employees
voluntarily, yet unwittingly, released Varity Corp. from its financial
obligations. 113 Varity Corp. persuaded the plaintiffs employed by
the corporation's failing divisions to embrace the change of
employer and benefit plan by calling a special meeting" 4 and
assuring the plaintiffs that MCC was financially viable and that
their benefits would remain secure." 5
After Varity Corp.'s
meeting, nearly "1,500 M-F Inc. employees accepted Varity's
assurances and voluntarily agreed to the transfer.""' 6 MCC,
however, incurred an eighty-eight million dollar loss at the end of7
its first year and completed its second year in receivership.1

112. See id. at 494. MCC was, in fact, "insolvent from the day it was created." Greta E.
Cowart & T. David Cowart, Court Cares About the Truth in Benefit Plans, SAN ANTONIO
Bus. J., Aug. 16, 1996, at 1. Varity Corp. had concealed a $46 million negative wo by
overvaluing MCC's assets and underestimating its liabilities. See id. Accordingly, MCC
finished its second year of operation in receivership and, therefore, shifted the loss to its plan
members. See id.
113. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 493-94. "Rather than terminate those benefits directly (as
[M-F Inc.] had retained the right to do), Varity attempted to avoid the undesirable fallout
that could have accompanied cancellation." Id. at 493.
114. The Court described the meeting as follows:
In the spring of 1986, Varity summoned the employees of Massey-Ferguson's
money-losing divisions to a meeting at Massey-Ferguson's corporate headquarters
for a 30-minute presentation. The employees saw a 90-second videotaped message
from Mr. Ivan Porter, a Varity vice-president and Massey Combines' newlyappointed president. They [the employees] also received four documents: (a) a
several-page, detailed comparison between the employee benefits offered by
Massey-Ferguson and those offered by Massey Combines; (b) a question-andanswer sheet; (c) a transcript of the Porter videotape; and (d) a cover letter with
an acceptance form. Each of these documents discussed employee benefits and
benefit plans, some briefly in general terms, and others at length and in detail.
Id. at 499.
115. "The thrust of Varity's remarks... was that the employee's benefits would remain
secure if they [the employees] voluntarily transferred to Massey Combines. As Varity knew,
however, the reality was very different." Id. at 494.
116. Id. "Varity also unilaterally assigned to Massey Combines the benefit obligations
it owed to some 4,000 workers who had retired from Massey-Ferguson prior to this
reorganization, without requesting permission or informing them of the assignment." Id.
117. See id.
[O]n March 4, 1988, the Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada appointed Peat,
Marwick Limited as the receiver of MCC. All operations ceased, and all
employees were terminated. The welfare benefits previously provided to retired
and disabled employees and to their dependents, including medical and health care
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Accordingly, MCC's newly acquired employees lost their welfare
benefits.18
The plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to ERISA"1 9 and federal

common law. The Plaintiffs sought an order for preliminary injunctive relief, which would require Varity Corp. and M-F Inc.-jointly
and severely-to reinstate their insurance coverage benefits as of

March 4, 1988.121

The United States District Court for the

Southern District of Iowa, Central Division, found that the benefit
plan entitled the employees and retirees to continued benefits for
life terms. 121 It reasoned that welfare benefits vest upon retirement and could not thereafter be terminated. 2 2 Accordingly, the
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 121 It also awarded monetary 124
relief in the form of "punitive
and/or extracontractual damages.,

benefits, also were terminated.
Howe v. Varity Corp, No. CIV.88-1598-E, 1989 WL 95595, at *2 (S.D. Iowa July 14, 1989).
118. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 494.
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
120. See Varity, 1989 WL 95595, at *1. The named plaintiffs filed the suit on October
26, 1988, on behalf of the class, seeking reinstatement of retirement and disability benefits.
The defendants moved to dismiss all counts on December 12, 1988. Pending the outcome
of a trial on the merits, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on December
16, 1988. See id. at *2.
121. The Varity Corporation's welfare benefit plan provided that:
The Company hereby reserves the right to amend or terminate the Plan or Trust
at any time, provided no such amendment or termination shall have the effect of
diverting Trust funds to purposes other than the exclusive benefit of the
Employees except as provided in Section 7.1. However, the right to amend or
terminate the Plan shall not, in any way, affect an Employee's right to claim
benefits, diminish, or eliminate any claims for benefits under the provisions of the
Plan to which the Employee shall have become entitled prior to the exercise of the
Company's right, through its Board, to terminate or amend.
Id. at *4.
122. See id.
123. See id. at *10. In determining whether preliminary injunctive relief should be
granted, the Eighth Circuit considered four factors:
(1) the probability the movant will succeed on the merits at trial; (2) the threat of
irreparable harm to the movant should the preliminary injunction be denied; (3)
the balance between this harm and the injury the preliminary injunction would
cause to the party opposing the injunction; and (4) the public interest.
Id. at *11. The district court found that Varity Corp. and M-F Inc., acting as ERISA
fiduciaries, had injured the plaintiffs through deliberate deception. Accordingly, the district
court held that both Varity Corp. and M-F Inc. had violated an ERISA-imposed fiduciary
obligation to administer MCC's benefit plan "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan." Id. at *13 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
124. Id. at *19.
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In granting the award of damages, the district court observed
that "[a]lthough extracontractual damages are not available under
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)[125 ] to participants and benefici-

aries

...

,[12] the United States Supreme Court specifically

reserved the question of whether such damages are available under
any other ERISA provision.' ' 27 The district court recognized
further that "several courts have held that punitive and/or extracontractual damages are available under ERISA.', 128 It stated that
punitive damages have been authorized as relief where "necessary
to deter breaches of the fiduciary duties., 129 Applying that

precept to the instant case, the district court accepted the plaintiffs'
allegations "that the defendants' breach of duty was 'willful,
wanton, malicious and with complete indifference to the rights of
Plaintiffs' and, therefore, held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to
130
punitive and/or extracontractual damages.',
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in relevant
part. 31 With respect to relief, however, the court of appeals
modified the district court's holding.132 The court of appeals
stated that "[o]nly equitable relief, as opposed to damages, is

125. Section 1109(a) provides that a fiduciary may be liable to the plan for a breach of
fiduciary duty and shall be subject to "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court
may deem appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
126. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
127. Varity, 1989 WL 95595, at *19. The district court also recognized that Justice
Brennan, in his concurrence in Russell, "strongly indicated that section 1132(a)(3) permits
a beneficiary to recover extracontractual damages." Id.
128. Id. See, e.g., Vogel v. Independence Fed. Sav. Bank, 692 F. Supp. 587, 596 (D. Md.
1988) (refusing to dismiss claim for extracontractual damages); James A. Dooley Assocs.
Employees Retirement Plan v. Reynolds, 654 F. Supp. 457, 461 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (explaining
that "ERISA allows for punitive damages for violations of ERISA fiduciary duties"); Smith
v. ABS Indus., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (refusing to dismiss claims for
extracontractual and punitive damages under sections 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3)).
129. Varity, 1989 WL 95595, at *19 (quoting Dooley, 654 F. Supp. at 461) (indicating that
"[plunitive damages may be necessary where a plaintiff can prove a malicious breach of
duty") (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. (quoting plaintiffs' complaint at paragraph 66). The jury awarded punitive
damages against M-F Inc. in the amount of $3 million and $33 million against Varity Corp.
See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 752 (8th Cir. 1994). Apparently, however, the district
court set aside the jury's award. See id.
131. See Varity, 36 F.3d at 756. Specifically, the court of appeals held "that the District
Court was correct in granting relief to the [plaintiffs] for [the defendants'] breach of fiduciary
duty." Id.
132. See id.
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available under ERISA['33 ] . .. and punitive damages are not, by
any stretch of the imagination, equitable relief."' 34 Furthermore,
the court of appeals indicated that the judgments for compensatory
damages could not stand.'35 The compensatory damages included
$7.6 million to the Retired Class and $712,332 to the ten named
individual plaintiffs. 136 The court of appeals reasoned that the
compensatory damages, like punitive damages, constituted "legal
relief, not equitable, and [are] not available under Section 502(a)(3).,,137 Rather, the court of appeals opined that the plaintiffs were
entitled to receive restitution to restore the Retired Class and the
individual plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied if the
misrepresentations had never occurred.13 8 Specifically, the court
of appeals stated:
The Retired Class should receive $696,195, an award in the
nature of restitution to compensate them for benefits of which,
at the time of trial, they had been deprived. The Retired Class
should also receive restitution for benefits accrued between the
time of trial and the entry of a final decree on remand. Finally,
they are entitled to an injunction reinstating them as members
of the M-F Welfare Benefits Plan under the terms of that plan
as it existed at the time of retirement. Similarly, the named
individual plaintiffs should receive as restitution the amounts set
opposite each of their names on page 81 of the District Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, totaling $81,812, plus an
amount to compensate them for benefits accrued but not paid
between the time of trial and the entry of a final decree on
remand. In addition they are entitled to an injunction reinstating them as members of the M-F
Plan as of the time of their
139
purported "transfer" to MCC.
The court of appeals determined that these payments could not
properly be characterized as damages; instead, it viewed the
payments as restitution. 4 ° The court of appeals explained that

133. Here, the court of appeals cited Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.
1992) (explaining that "[d]amages are damages, and an award of damages is a legal, not an
equitable, remedy"). See Varity, 36 F.3d at 752.
134. Varity, 36 F.3d at 761.
135. See id. at 756.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Varity, 36 F.3d at 756.
140. See id.
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the payments it ordered were exactly what the plaintiffs would have
received if they had remained at M-F Inc. and that, accordingly, the
plaintiffs "are restored to their rightful position."14' 1
In affirming the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court indicated
that the plaintiffs must be able to rely on section 502(a)(3) "or they
have no remedy at all."' 4 2 It reasoned that the plaintiffs could
not proceed under the first subsection "because they were no
longer members of the Massey-Ferguson plan and, therefore, had
no 'benefits due [them] under the terms of [the] plan."" 43
Furthermore, the Court explained that the plaintiffs could not
proceed under the second subsection "because that provision, tied
to [section] 409, does not provide a remedy for individual beneficiaries."'" Finally, the Court was not convinced that denial of a
145
remedy would serve any ERISA-related purpose.
The issue whether money damages was an appropriate form of
relief for the Varity plaintiffs was not raised before the Supreme
Court and, therefore, the Court did not consider the issue in its
complexity.' 46 However, this issue was the sole subject of the
147
dissenting opinion in the court of appeals.

141. Id. The court of appeals also stated that:
Equity will treat that as done which ought to have been done. Or, to put it in
words that fit the present case more precisely, equity will disregard that which
ought not to have been done. Plaintiffs should never have been lured away from
M-F into the financially shaky MCC.
Id.
142. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
143. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994)).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve three issues: (1) whether Varity
Corp. and M-F Inc. were acting in their capacities as ERISA fiduciaries when they
"significantly and deliberately misled the beneficiaries;" (2) "in misleading the beneficiaries,
did the employer[s] violate the fiduciary obligations that ERISA [section] 404 imposes upon
plan administrators;" and (3) whether ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes ERISA plan
beneficiaries to recover individually from an employer when they are "harmed by an
administrator's breach of fiduciary obligations." Id. at 492.
Accordingly, the Court held first that an employer's intentional representation about
the future of plan benefits is an act of plan administration. See id. at 501. Second, the Court
held that an employer's knowing and significant participation in deceiving a plan's
beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense is a violation
of ERISA section 404(a). See id. at 506-07. "ERISA [section 404(a)] requires a 'fiduciary'
to 'discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries." Id. at 506 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)). Finally, the Court held that ERISA
section 502(a)(3) authorizes lawsuits for individual equitable relief. See id. at 515.
147. Circuit Judge Hansen concurred in parts I through V of the court of appeals'
opinion, relating to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to relief; however, Judge Hansen
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C Judge Hansen's Dissent
Circuit Judge Hansen recognized that the judgment for the
individual plaintiffs was clearly determined by the district court to
be a "judgment for compensatory damages (actual expenses). ' 4 8
Similarly, the judgment for the Retired Class was a "judgment for
compensatory damages ... in the amount of $696,195. ' ' 149 Judge
Hansen observed further that "[i]n his fact-findings numbered 117
and 119, the district judge characterized the same amounts as 'the
value of past benefits lost.' 15 ° According to Judge Hansen,
however, "[p]ast benefits lost" were "the same as monetary
damages for benefits owed under the plan, and under Novak[151]
are legal and not equitable relief.' 152 Furthermore, Judge Hansen
observed that:
[M]ore than the value of the benefits [the plaintiffs] lost under
the plan has been included in the amounts the [circuit] court
now awards as restitution. In fact, included in the awarded
individual amounts are sums that the individual plaintiffs
expended as premiums for replacement health insurance policies
when their plan provided benefits ceased.'53
Judge Hansen stated that he had great difficulty in recognizing
those sums as restitution.'54 Rather, he viewed them as "traditional consequential damages and unrecoverable under [section]
1132(a)(3) [(ERISA section 502(a)(3))].' 55
Judge Hansen
believed that the court of appeals took what the trial court
determined were compensatory damages and "fashioned equitable
relief by calling it all by another name, i.e. in the nature of
56
restitution.,

dissented from Part VI of the opinion which related solely to the appropriate form of relief.
See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 757 (8th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 756 (quoting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Howe v. Varity Corp.,
No. CIV.88-1598-E, 1989 WL 95595 (S.D. Iowa July 14, 1989), at 81 (filed Mar. 26, 1993)).
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Varity, 1989 WL 95595, at 81
(filed Mar. 26, 1993)).
151. See Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1992).
152. Varity, 36 F.3d at 757 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153.

Id.

154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 757-58.
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V.

Varity and Mertens Considered Together

A.

The Problem

In his dissent, Judge Hansen asserted that the Eighth Circuit
awarded the Varity plaintiffs both direct damages and consequential
damages rather than restitution.157 If Judge Hansen's thesis is

correct, then the result of Varity rests in conflict with the holding
in Mertens. In June 1993, Mertens expressly precluded an award of
damages for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 502(a)(3).158 In March 1996, however, Varity authorized an award that
included, in effect, both direct damages and extracontractual or
consequential damages.'5 9 The distinction between damages and
restitution, and between direct and consequential damages, serves
to illuminate the reasoning that propels Judge Hansen's dissent.
B. Damages and Restitution: The Distinction
Setting aside the issue whether "other appropriate equitable
relief" contemplates an award of money damages, if the federal
courts seek to establish bright-line rules that are capable of guiding
other courts in the future, then the courts will have to articulate a
clear distinction between the meaning of damages and the meaning
of restitution.
It is aphoristic that "[d]amages differs from
restitution in that damages is measured by the plaintiff's loss;
restitution is measured by the defendant's unjust gain."' 6 ° Although the concepts of restitution and damages are distinct, they

157. See Varity, 36 F.3d at 757 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993).
159. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
160. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1, at 208 (2d ed. 1993). In the legal arena,
the term "restitution" is used in at least three contexts: (1) as recovery based on and
measured by unjust enrichment; (2) as restoration in-kind of a specific thing; and (3) as
restoration of the value of what plaintiff lost. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and
Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279-82 (1989). When the term restitution
is used to indicate the value of what a plaintiff lost, the meaning of restitution is equivalent
to compensatory damages. See id. at 1282-83. In this context, the term "loses all utility as
a means of distinguishing one body of law from another." Id. at 1283. Accordingly, Laycock
suggests that "[r]estitution must be distinguished from compensation, either by its focus on
restoration of the loss in kind or by its focus on defendant's gain as the measure of
recovery." Id. This analysis compels the conclusion that the only appropriate meaning of
restitution, when applied to Varity, is a focus on the defendant's gain as the measure of
recovery. It makes no sense to define restitution in the Varity context under the second
theory because the plaintiffs were not seeking restoration of a loss in-kind.
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serve as continual sources of confusion to many courts. 61 These
notions may be confused fuer "by the fact that the amount of the
defendant's gains may furnish some evidence about the plaintiff's
probable losses."1 62 Nonetheless, it is dangerous for courts to
blurr the distinction between these two remedies because both
courts and parties to suits look to past decisions for guidance in
determining what types of relief are specifically authorized in their
respective suits.
A plaintiff might recover the same dollar amount through
either damages or restitution; nevertheless, each remedy is
triggered by a different situation and is measured by a different
gauge. 63 While the purpose of damages is to compensate the
plaintiff, the goal of restitution is to prevent unjust enrichment to
the defendant."6 Accordingly, courts must measure damages by
determining the value of the plaintiff's loss or injury.165 In
contrast, courts must measure restitution by determining the value
of the defendant's gain."
In some cases, the plaintiff's injury is equivalent to the
defendant's gain.1 67 This situation might occur, for example,
where the defendant steals the plaintiff's car. In this situation, the
plaintiff's loss and the defendant's gain are equivalent because what
the plaintiff lost, the defendant gained."6 According to the law
of remedies, "[i]n such cases it does not always matter whether one
thinks of awarding damages as compensation for the plaintiff's loss
or restitution as disgorgement of the defendant's gain., 169 However, that situation does not accurately describe the events that
occurred in Varity.
C. Damages Theory Applied to Varity

In Varity, the defendants' gain was more than the value of the
plaintiffs' loss. The benefit derived by Varity Corp. and M-F Inc.
included not only the plaintiffs' lost plan benefits but, in addition,

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.

DOBBS, supra note 160, at 280.
id.
id.
id.
DOBBS, supra note 160, at 280.
id.
id.
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the value of any interest accrued through retention of the plan
benefits and any profits earned by the continued viability of
business operations. Thus, the events of Varity would be more akin
to a situation where the defendant steals the plaintiff's car and then
sells the car for more than its value at the time of conversion. 7 °
Generally, "[s]uch a recovery would not be a recovery of damages
because it would be measured by the defendant's gain, not the
plaintiff's loss. '71
Applying these concepts to Varity, if the court of appeals
sought to award pure restitution, then its remedy would have
included the value of the plaintiffs' lost plan benefits, the interest
derived therefrom, and any profits resulting from the continued
operations of both Varity Corp. and M-F Inc. Although profits
would not restore the Varity plaintiffs with a sum that they once
had or would have had, profits would, nevertheless, be available to
the Varity plaintiffs in order to avoid unjust enrichment."i These
distinctions represent the full value of the benefit derived by both
Varity Corp. and M-F Inc. However, the court of appeals awarded
17 3
the plaintiffs a sum equal to the value of the lost plan benefits.
The award included neither accrued interest nor profits from the
defendants' business operations."' Accordingly, although the
court of appeals described the plaintiffs' relief as "restitution," it
actually awarded a sum that reflected direct damages. This
conclusion is fully consistent with Judge Hansen's analysis in his
dissenting opinion in Varity.'75 The question remains, however,
whether the Eighth Circuit also awarded the Varity plaintiffs a sum
that reflected consequential damages.
D. Consequential Damages
The federal courts appear to agree on the distinction between
direct damages and extracontractual damages. In the ERISA
context, direct damages stem from all benefit payments to which

170. See id.
171. DOBBS, supra note 160, at 280.
172. See Laycock, supra note 160, at 1281 (explaining that a plaintiff is entitled to profits
that she would not have made when defendant misappropriates the plaintiff's property and
uses it to make large profits).
173. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994). Judge Hansen observed,
however, that the sum may also have included consequential damages. See id. at 757
(Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. See id. at 756.
175. See id.
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17 6
the plan participant or beneficiary is contractually entitled.
Conversely, any relief sought that is not within the terms of an
ERISA-governed plan is extracontractual.177 The latter would
include compensation for any economic loss that resulted from an
interruption of benefit payments.'78 This type of recovery is
precisely what Judge Hansen considered to be consequential
damages when he stated that the Eighth Circuit's plaintiff award
included "sums that the individual plaintiffs expended as premiums
for replacement health insurance policies when their plan provided
benefits ceased., 179 This distinction leaves little doubt as to
whether the Eighth Circuit did, in fact, award extracontractual
damages to the Varity plaintiffs.

VI. Problems Posed by Varity
The distinctions between damages and restitution, and between
direct damages and extracontractual damages, indicate that Judge
Hansen was correct when he concluded that the Eighth Circuit had
awarded the Varity plaintiffs damages rather than restitution.
Nevertheless, that court called the award "restitution," and the
Supreme Court affirmed. Perhaps both courts believed that the
plaintiffs were entitled to relief but felt restricted by the remedy
parameters established in Mertens.
A.

ERISA Section 502 (a) (3)(B) Should Be Interpreted to
Authorize Direct Damages

Direct damages should be available under section 502(a)(3)(B)
because Congress incorporated the underlying principles of trust
law and contract law into ERISA. 180 Both of these bodies of law
contemplate direct damage awards for breaches of trust and
contract respectively.
Justice White correctly observed in his Mertens dissent that
ERISA is rooted in the common law of trusts. 18' Nonetheless, ERISA's drafters intended the Act to protect contractually defined

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1994).
See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1988).
See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 137 (1985).
Varity, 36 F.3d at 757.
See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 263.
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benefits. 8 2 Because contract law authorizes remedies foreseeable
to contracting parties, direct damages awards serve to reflect those
losses due under the contractual terms of the plan. Accordingly,
when courts have authorized damage awards, these awards have
effectuated the contractual terms of the plan.
Furthermore, direct damages should be authorized by section
502(a)(3)(B) because this type of relief makes sense from a pragmatic standpoint. Mertens limited the remedies authorized by
section 502(a)(3)(B) to equitable remedies including mandamus,
injunction, and restitution. While Mertens appears to protect
defendants from large damage awards, its holding ironically illserves defendants in actions brought pursuant to section 502(a)(3)
because it expands the scope of any defendant's potential liability.
While an award of damages would limit a plaintiff's recovery solely
to the value of lost plan benefits, an award of restitution expands
the reach of a plaintiff's recovery to include any gains made by a
defendant in addition to the value of any lost plan benefits. In
Varity, for example, the plaintiffs' lawyers would have obtained
greater sums for their clients by seeking restitution rather than
damages.t8 3 However, by awarding damages, the Eighth Circuit
mitigated the sums to be paid by the defendant.
B.

ExtracontractualDamages Are Not Authorized Under ERISA
Section 502(a) (3) (B)

"The term extracontractual properly defines damages proximately caused by a breach of trust.''184 Section 502(a)(3)(B),
however, does not contemplate awards for proximately caused
injuries even though these awards may be appealing in some
situations.
For example, employees and beneficiaries who are entitled to
benefits under ERISA-governed plans often sustain losses that

182. See Flint, supra note 16, at 616. Two separate instruments serve to govern employee
benefit programs. A plan instrument, executed by the employer an plan administrators, "sets
forth the rights and duties of the employer, the plan administrator, and participants." Id.
This instrument is in the form of a contract. A trust instrument, executed by the employer
and initial trustee, sets forth the rights and duties of the employer and trustee relating to the
assets of the benefit program. This instrument is executed in the form of a trust document.
Accordingly, both contract and trust law principles should serve to govern employee benefit
plans. See id.
183. See supra Part IV.C.
184. Robertson, supra note 7, at 720.
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exceed the sums enumerated in the plans. 185 In these situations,
personal liability for extracontractual damages would deter
employers and fiduciaries from violating the terms of the plans they
administer and, therefore, reduce the frequency of losses to
unsuspecting benefit recipients.1 6 For example, in Warren v.
Society National Bank,187 the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit considered whether section 502(a)(3) authorizes
the recovery of compensatory damages to "redress a direct injury
to a participant by a fiduciary that allegedly violated its contractual
duty under the terms of the retirement plans and under the
provisions of ERISA. '1 8 8 The plaintiff in Warren was a physician
and participant in two of his employer's retirement plans-a
pension plan and a profit sharing trust. 189 The Society National

Bank ("SNB"), trustee of both plans, offered its plan participants
the option to withdraw their share of the plan assets in a single
lump-sum payment.19 °
In 1984, the plaintiff sought to "'roll over' his interest in the
two retirement plans into a self-directed individual retirement
account (IRA)."1 91 This type of transfer enabled individuals 1to92
continue the deferral of income taxes on their plan assets.
Accordingly, the plaintiff directed SNB to transfer all of the assets

in his retirement accounts to an investment banking firm, Prescott,
Ball and Turbine, Inc. ("PBT"). 93
SNB transferred nearly
$388,148 to PBT by December 11, 1984.194 However, SNB failed

185. See Flint, supra note 16, at 614 (asserting that "ERISA provides participants
recovery for extracontractual damages in certain situations, just as if the benefits-due lawsuit
were brought under either contract law or trust law").
186. See id. See also Lafoy v. HMO Colo., 988 F.2d 97, 101 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
extracontractual relief is supported by policy and justice); Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (indicating that by removing extracontractual
damages from pool of ERISA remedies, "the courts are removing a historical disincentive
to insurance company misbehavior"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
187. 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990).
188. Id. at 981.
189. See id. at 976. The plaintiff, Robert Warren, was employed by Westgate Medical
Anesthesia Group. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. The SNB plan provisions "specifically allowed such a rollover as a means for
continued deferral of income taxes on plan assets." Id.
192. See Warren, 905 F.2d at 976.
193. See id. The plaintiff's balance in the two accounts totaled $556,242 as of September
30, 1984. See id.
194. See id.
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to transfer the remaining balance of $168,094 until May 23,
1985.19' Therefore, the transfer was not accomplished in a single
calendar year, and the plaintiff was forced to pay taxes on the
portion of the transfer received by PBT in 1985.196
The plaintiff sued SNB claiming that the bank breached its
fiduciary duty to him by failing to transfer all of the assets in his
retirement account to the IRA in the calendar year of 1984.1'
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code authorized a tax-free
rollover only if the transfer was accomplished within a single
calendar year. 198 Furthermore, the $168,094 transferred in 1985
could no longer be retained in the IRA because the funds lost their
eligibility for rollover treatment. 199 Accordingly, the plaintiff
claimed that he lost the benefit of tax deferment as an enhancement to his future income and that the resulting damages totaled
$375,430.20
Warren demonstrates that a plaintiff may very well incur losses
not contemplated by the terms of the plan. In Warren, these losses
included income taxes paid and lost future earnings. 2 1 These
losses resulted "solely because a fiduciary of the plan failed to act
as required under ERISA, solely in the interest of all participants.' '2'
Here, consequential damages and the associated
punitive damages would deter fiduciaries from delaying retirement
payments until the retiree sues. 20 3 Otherwise, "the sponsoring
employer would gain the benefit of the fiduciary's delay or the
payee's failure to pursue legal action, without penalty., 2°4 Although Warren illustrates one compelling reason for awarding

195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Warren, 905 F.2d at 976. "The amended complaint alleged that, either through
negligence or in order to earn additional fees as trustee, SNB failed to distribute all of Dr.
Warren's plan assets during a single calendar year." Id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. Mrs. Warren joined Dr. Warren as a plaintiff because she was both a
beneficiary of the plans and a joint income tax filer; however, the court of appeals referred
to the plaintiffs collectively as "Dr. Warren of the plaintiff." Id.
201. See id.
202. Flint, supra note 16, at 618; see also ERISA § 404(a), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1994) (stating that a fiduciary must discharge its duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries).
203. See Flint, supra note 16, at 618.
204. Id. at 619.
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consequential damages, this remedy is, nevertheless, unavailable
under section 502(a)(3)(B).
Proponents of consequential damage awards under section
502(a)(3)(B) have advanced several arguments in support of their
position. First, these proponents assert that when a money damage
award is the only remedy that is capable of furnishing complete
25
relief, trust law principles authorize money damage awards.
Those who support this view suggest that ERISA should not be
interpreted to limit damage awards simply because the Act is silent
with respect to whether extracontractual relief should be available.20 6 In other words, "silence should not be read to limit the
statute, but rather should be read to allow courts the discretion in
equity to afford the most complete relief courts can., 2 7 Nevertheless, ERISA's remedy structure is comprehensive, and it reflects
detailed remedy provisions. 208 Congress could have specifically
29
authorized extracontractual relief if it had intended to do so. 1
Significantly, although its original drafts contained language
authorizing both equitable and legal relief, no provisions authorizing legal relief "survived the final enactment of ERISA .... ,210
C

Blurring the Differences

While the lower courts continue to struggle with the characterization of remedies available under section 502(a)(3)(B), several
dangers are likely to surface as a result of the Supreme Court's
failure to confront the questions that surround that section. First,
a risk exists that judgments will include sums that exceed those
authorized by the terms of the plan. If courts fail to consider the
proper distinction between damages and restitution and assign
"restitution" where damages are due, plaintiffs will begin to exploit
this characterization. That is, plaintiffs will seek the full force of
the restitutionary measure and obtain defendant profits, in addition
to the value of benefits due, where the value of benefits due may
have served as sufficient compensation. Furthermore, if courts
continue to award consequential damages where they are not

205. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 717.
206. See id. at 718.
207. Id.
208. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (describing ERISA's comprehensive
enforcement scheme).
209. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 718.
210. Id.
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authorized, employees, retirees, and beneficiaries may find
themselves without any access to pension plans and welfare
benefits. 211 Employers are not required to provide these plans.
The ERISA provisions take effect only when employers offer

pension plans and welfare benefits. 212 Employers often provide
these plans because they receive substantial tax benefits by doing
so. 21 3 But, where "court costs and damage awards exceed the

benefit that employers receive from the government in the form of
favorable tax treatment, employers, due to the 214
prohibitive costs,
may no longer provide employee benefit plans.,
VII. Conclusion
The issue whether ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B) authorizes
damages is unsettled. In Varity the Supreme Court affirmed an
Eighth Circuit decision that authorized individual plaintiffs to
recover both direct damages and consequential damages. That
result is in conflict with the Court's prior decision in Mertens which
removed damages from the pool of available remedies authorized
by ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B). Nonetheless, while consequential
damages are not authorized under section 502(a)(3)(B), direct
damages should be available under that section, and courts should

refer to the remedy as "direct damages" not restitution. The courts
may determine which damages are direct by looking to the plan
itself; this will expressly indicate what benefits are due.2 15 Damage awards outside of the benefits due under the express terms of
the plan are extracontractual and should not be recoverable.21 6
John D. Shire

211. See id. at 721.
212. See CANAN, supra note 15, at 307 (explaining that a benefit becomes vested under
ERISA at the moment that the benefit becomes non-forfeitable).
213. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 721; see also CANAN, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining
that tax advantages make qualified retirement plans attractive to employers).
214. Robertson, supra note 7, at 721. In Varity, the Supreme Court stated that:
[C]ourts may have to take account of competing congressional purposes, such as
Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex
that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering benefit plans in the first place.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
215. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 720.
216. See id. See also Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir.
1988) (noting that damages are extracontractual if not contained within the plan's terms).

